The prevailing assumption in recent literature is that strategic choice and environmental determinism represent mutually exclusive, competing explanations of organizational adaptation. The present paper, in contrast, argues that choice and determinism are independent variables that can be positioned on two separate continua to develop a typology of organizational adaptation. The interactions of these variables result in four main types: (1) natural selection, with minimum choice and adaptation or selection out, (2) differentiation, with high choice and high environmental determinism and adaptation within constraints, (3) strategic choice, with maximum choice and adaptation by design, and (4) undifferentiated choice, with incremental choice and adaptation by chance. These types influence the number and forms of strategic options of organizations, the decisional emphasis on means or ends, political behavior and conflict, and the search activities of the organization in its environment. Ven, 1983) . At issue is a view of adaptation as a process reflecting choice and selection versus one in which it is a necessary reaction to peremptory environmental forces (Child, 1972; Aldrich, 1979) . In analogous terms, the issue is one of the prepotency of voluntarism or external determinism in the strategic change process (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) . The present paper argues that classifying change as either organizationally or environmentally determined is misleading and diverts research inquiry away from the critical interactive nature of organization-environment relationships in the adaptation process. Ven's (1983) recent exhaustive review suggests a major difference in current theory between a deterministic and a voluntaristic orientation in theories of organizational adaptation. One of the dimensions in their typology is a continuum ranging from determinism to voluntarism, which is divided to place major schools of organizational analysis into two mutually exclusive categories. While their placement of schools of analysis in one category or the other is intended solely to classify them, it clearly implies the either-or nature of the debate on the prepotency of voluntarism or determinism. Major approaches to the issue of strategic change or adaptation emphasize mutually exclusive and different ends of what is really a single continuum. A related implication in the existing literature is the assumption that a binary distinction between choice and determinism captures the reality of organizational behavior and change. As popular and intuitively pleasing as these categories may be, a reliance on one or the other directs attention away from the fact that both are essential to an accurate description of organizational adaptation. The important conceptual and practical issues are the interaction or interdependence of events 336 with individual interpretations of them, and the resultant decisions or actions. Astley and Van de Ven (1983: 267), for example, concluded that the interesting research questions about complex organizations would (1) admit to both deterministic and voluntaristic views, and (2) juxtapose those views to study their interactions and reciprocal interdependence over time. The same view is expressed by Weick (1979) , who argued that construction of mutually exclusive categories, reliance on unidirectional causation, and focusing on origins and terminations of variables such as "choice" are problematic and distorting for theorist and practitioner alike. What is critical is an ability to "think in circles" (Weick, 1979: 52) , to investigate the process of interaction or mutual causation, as a reciprocal relationship between two sets of variables unfolds. The important research issue of voluntarism versus determinism is the relationship between them and how their interactions and resultant tensions culminate in changes over time. The issue is how choice is both a cause and a consequence of environmental influences, as cause and consequence interact and conflict to result in noticeable organizational adaptations. A similar view is expressed in studies on power (e.g., Dahl, 1963; Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981) , in which the underlying dependencies or relative vulnerabilities of organization and environment interact to create tensions and produce both organizational and environmental change. The implicit power model is one of influence and countervailing power, and the relative power of organization and environment, i.e., external stakeholders, over time is the key to explaining the prepotency of choice or determinism in the adaptation process. If high organizational power suggests greater choice, while higher power of stakeholders results in greater environmental determinism, the occasion of a powerful organization confronting equally powerful stakeholders indicates that high choice and high determinism may coexist. The purpose of this paper is to develop this interactive view of the adaptation process in organizations.1 Following the advice and lead of Astley and Van de Ven (1983), Weick (1979) , and others (Jacobs, 1974) , it is argued that: (1) choice and determinism are not at opposite ends of a single continuum of effect but in reality represent two independent variables, and (2) the interaction or interdependence of the two must be studied to explain organizational behavior. The paper develops a typology of strategic decision making that facilitates the study of the interactions between voluntarism and determinism. It also allows for a needed integration of the diverse and disparate literatures in organization theory, management, and economics, which currently focus on the prepotency either of choice or environmental determinism in the adaptation process.
One of the most pervasive and central arguments in recent treatments of organizational adaptation concerns whether it is managerially or environmentally derived (Astley and Van de
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The term "adaptation" in the current literature is employed in a number of ways, ranging simply from "change," including both proactive and reactive behavior (Miles and Snow, 1978) , to a more specific denotation of "reaction" to environmental forces or demands (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). The usage in this paper is more consistent with the former meaning, indicating change that obtains as a result of aligning organizational capabilities with envirornmental contingencies (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984) . This view allows for proactive or reactive organizational behavior in, anticipation of or reaction to exogenous variables. environment, thereby purposively creating their own measures of reality and delimiting their own decisions (Child, 1972; Weick, 1979) . On the other hand, discernible features of the actual environment are also important; structural characteristics of industries or domains and various niches clearly exist, some of which are intractable to control by individuals and their organizations. At times the effects of these are peremptory (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979; Porter, 1980) ; at other times they must at least be considered in the strategic decisions of organizations. Using two separate, independent factors emphasizes that choice and determinism must interact or coalesce to define a causal fabric or context either nurturant of any given organizational variation or hostile to it (Emery and Trist, 1965) . This approach follows logically from the open-systems theory of organizations (Miller, 1965; von Bertalanffy, 1968 ). An open system tends toward a state of dynamic equilibrium with its environment through the continuous exchange of materials, data, and energy. Both the system and its environment can affect this process of exchange and transformation, suggesting their independence and the importance of their interactive effects. More importantly, open systems are characterized by equifinality, that is, the same outcomes can be achieved in multiple ways, with different resources, diverse transformation processes, and various methods or means. Even if it is assumed that the environment of an open system is highly deterministic, controlling fully and precisely the ends or outcomes that are tolerated, organizational choice is still possible, due to the control over and selection of the means by which the prescribed outcomes may be achieved. Even in the most constraining and debilitating case of environmental determinism, equifinality indicates that organizational choice nonetheless exists as a separate, independent variable important to the development of a dynamic equilibrium with the external environment. Choice, then, can be separated from environmental determinism in a logical way, as a necessary defining characteristic of the organization as an open system. The purpose of the following discussion is to examine the two variables in interaction. Choice and determinism can be represented on axes ranging from low to high as shown in Figure 1 . Each axis denotes variance on levels of assertiveness and potential to influence others (Daft and Weick, 1984) . The quadrants help to define the domain and scope of power in the relationship between organization and environment (Dahl, 1963) and the relative vulnerability of each in an interactive setting (Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981 ).
Quadrant I basically shows the conditions or assumptions underlying the population ecology, natural selection approach to adaptation -low strategic choice and high environmental determinism (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979) , in which it is argued that organizations enjoy virtually no control over exogenous factors. Adaptation is determined from without, as the environment selects organizations and allows only those forms with appropriate variations to remain. As Figure 1 indicates, proponents of this view argue that, under these conditions, organizations adapt or are selected out. Examples of Quadrant I situations include organizations working under conditions labeled as perfectly competitive. Viewed in the long runc individual firms exercise little discretion because market or competitive forces determine the "fair"y return that an organization can achieve. Prices are dictated by a market in which demand is perfectly elastic. Differentiating products to command premium prices and excess profits is difficult, if not impossible. Firms that do not keep abreast of technological and market changes find costs rising above a horizontal demand curve, clearly threatening survival. Quadrant I would include mnany small organizations, those selling commodity-type products, and simple systems (Herbst, 1957; Aldrich, 1979) , as well as large organizations with undifferentiated products or services, conf ronted with low entry and exit barriers and with no way of achieving a lasting competitive advantage (Bain, 1957; Porter, 1980 Weick, 1979) . The introduction of differentiated (Quadrant 11) and incremental (Quadrant IV) choice, however, presents additional implications for research, as shown in Table 1 .
Number and type of strategic options. From the arguments about choice, it follows that the number and type of strategic options would vary across the typology. There are few viable strategic options in Quadrants I and IV, but for different reasons; external constraints delimit choice in Quadrant 1, whereas internal factors inhibit decision making in Quadrant IV. The number of options is highest in Quadrant Ill and, one could argue, fairly high in Quadrant 11, where choice coexists with externally generated constraints. But the types of choice what organizations can control and affect -varies significantly between Quadrants II and Ill, despite the high number of strategic options available in each case. These significant differences, as well as others in Table 1 , can be highlighted and underscored by focusing on two critical components of decision making, i.e., means and ends (Simon, 1976; Thompson, 1967) and on the notion of equifinality in open systems (Miller, 1965; von Bertalanffy, 1968) .
Emphasis on means and ends. Table 1 suggests that the constrained choice of Quadrant I really reflects control over means. The "simple system" (Herbst, 1957) or firm in a highly competitive, atomistic industry confronts many givens, most notably, constraints on or lack of control over markets, prices, demand, and even profitability (the "fair return") (Bain, 1957; Stonier and Hague, 1961) . Whatever choice exists focuses primarily on means, different techniques to transform inputs or produce outputs in more efficient ways so as to achieve some excess profit or even a short-lived competitive advantage (Bain, 1957) . Industry structure allows for some control over intraorganizational process but not over extraorganizational market outcomes. (Thompson, 1967) , and a lack of focused strategy or clear membership in a strategic group (Porter, 1980), would appear to be most likely to flourish under the conditions of Quadrant IV.
likely to be higher in Quadrant 111, where few external constraints exist and internal competition for resources and influence is the more probable contributor to conflict. Search processes. In the present typology, search processes are not consistent with the popular binary distinction between strategic choice and environmental determinism in the literature, which basically suggests high effective search versus low, ineffective search at the two extremes of a single continuum. The present analysis suggests that both the amount and qualitative nature of search vary across the typology (March, 1981; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984) . In Quadrant 1, search is probably not low or impotent, as the population ecologists or environmental determinists argue. Rather, search is more likely to be high but "solution driven," directed toward the solution of specific problems, e.g., lowering cost curves and increasing efficiency to compete or survive under perfectly competitive conditions (March, 1981) . Facing a host of problematic dependencies, the organization actively seeks ways to lessen the control or influence of environmental forces. In Quadrant Ill, by contrast, search is also high but is qualitatively different than in Quadrant I; externally generated constraints and dependencies are fewer, if they exist, and the time in which to make strategic decisions is longer and less problematic. The adaptation and implementation horizons are longer (March, 1981; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984) , allowing for a more relaxed approach to search activities, what March (1981) calls "slack search." Search is not driven by the quest for immediate solutions that marks the search activity in Quadrant 1. Slack search is less tied to specific organizational needs or pressures and is even apt occasionally to resemble a process of "dabbling" or nondirected activity. In Quadrant 11, search would be both solution-driven and slack search,. The problematic nature of the environment demands that solution-driven search be high, as the organization attempts to gain control over key environmental stakeholders and contingencies or reduce their impact. But organizational choice is simultaneously high, with control over some ends but primarily over means or internal processes. Some dabbling is possible, therefore, as the organization engages in slack search and experimentation in areas in which it enjoys control and influence. In Quadrant IV, search is problematic, because of the organization's inability to take advantage of a benign, placid environment. Other variables undoubtedly can be identified and variations in them predicted as a function of organizational location in Figure  1 . The purpose of this paper, however, is not to provide an exhaustive coverage of such variables but to stress the usefulness of the typology developed in explaining the relation between choice and determinism.
DISCUSSION
The most obvious conclusion of this study is that the interdependence and interactions between strategic choice and environmental determinism define adaptation; each is insufficient and both are necessary to a satisfadtory explication of organizational adaptation.
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A second and related conclusion is that adaptation is a dynamic process that is the result of the relative strength and type of power or dependency between organization and environment. The forces of Figure 1 are not static; actions by organizations and environmental elements that underlie the different strategic contexts are potentially important for the creation or alteration of dependencies or relative vulnerabilities that will affect future actions and decisions (Jacobs, 1974; Lawrence, 1981) . Changes result from the interaction between choice and determinism (Weber, 1947 (Weber, , 1967 , the interplay of various political and economic forces (Dahl, 1963) , and the interplay between means and ends over time (Thompson, 1967; March, 1981) . Both strategic choice and environmental determinism provide thrusts for change; each is both a cause and a consequence of the other in the adaptation process. To understand this dynamic change phenomenon, it is necessary to "think in circles" (Weick, 1979) , to investigate the reciprocity of relationships between organization and environment, and to study the mutual causation that obtains.
Viewing adaptation as a dynamic process reveals that for any given organization, elements or variables related to strategic choice and environmental determinism exist simultaneously. In Quadrant I of Figure 1 , the environment is prepotent, but strategic decisions are directed toward the alteration of dependencies and the movement of the organization, at minimum, toward Quadrant 11. In Quadrant 11, both the organization and environmental elements have power; analysis of internal and exogenous forces reveals that each side is vulnerable in some areas but simultaneously is able to create dependencies in others. Any given organization in Quadrant II could be expected to attempt to reduce its vulnerabilities through (1) competitive actions to differentiate further its products or services, build entry barriers or reduce exit barriers, or reduce problematic dependencies on suppliers or customers (Porter, 1980); or (2) political actions such as collusion, cooperation, or co-optation to absorb or diffuse important environmental elements (Dahl, 1963; Thompson, 1967) . Environmental elements -competitors, regulators, consumers -in turn, exercise their influence in similar attempts to retain or increase competitive or political advantage. The net result of these interactions is that organizations may remain in Quadrant 11, gain additional influence over their environment and move to Quadrant Ill, or lose power and move toward the relatively disadvantageous conditions of Quadrant 1. Whatever the actual evolution, the essential point is that adaptation is a dynamic process that is both organizationally and environmentally inspired.
A final important implication of the present analysis is that simple models relying on the conceptual construction of mutually exclusive, competing explanations of cause and effect may not be sufficient to capture the complexity and richness of organizational behavior. The discussion of the research implications (Table 1) tional adaptation is the subject of inquiry in organizational behavior, management, and economics, which emphasize different and often competing assumptions, foci, and explanations of cause and effect. What is needed is a greater emphasis on integration rather than differentiation of views. Research needs to be more concerned with reducing conceptual or theoretical barriers between disciplines and literatures and the consequent emphasis on eclectic approaches to explain organizational behavior.
